Research Seminars (Archive)
Factional Splits in Proto-Hegemonic Mass Parties: The Case of the Welfare/Virtue Party in TurkeyLecturer: Marek Hudík Affiliation: Charles University Mendel Univ., Zemědělská 1, Brno, Room Q474 1:00 PM • 10/17/2013
Abstract: How does factional split occur in proto-hegemonic mass parties characterized by ideologies such as ultra-nationalism, socialism or religious fundamentalism? In our study, we show that the struggle of the opposition factions against the party leader's policies resembles the struggle of the opposition forces in authoritarian regimes. We build a game-theoretic model of factional split borrowing from the collective action theory used in revolution studies: The collective action problem, together with the fact that the party leader possesses an extensive control over the party organization, makes the replacement of the party leader with the opposition's canÂdidate unlikely. We argue that it is incomplete power transformation that typically results in factional split in these parties: The opposition succeeds in accumulating some power vis-Ă -vis the party leader but this amount of power is insufficient for the leadership turnover to occur. On the other hand, it may be sufficient to establish the organizational and electoral basis of a new party. We apply our model to the case of the religious fundamentalist Welfare/Virtue Party (1994-2001) in Turkey.
Corruption and Manipulation of Public Procurement: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary ThresholdsLecturer: Filip Pertold Affiliation: CERGE-EI ESF, Lipová 41a, Brno, Room S309 1:00 PM • 10/3/2013
Abstract: We present a methodology for detecting manipulation of public procurement and evidence showing how policies that create discontinuous incentives to avoid transparent competition lead to manipulation and active waste by procurement officials. Our methodology exploits a natural experiment in which new discretionary thresholds in the anticipated value of procurements were established. Manipulations reveal through bunching of procurements below the new thresholds and affect 11% of relevant contracts. Manipulations lead to increases in the chance of allocating contracts to anonymously owned firms often related to corrupt behavior, increases in the final prices of procurements and preferential prices for anonymous contractors.