Research Seminars (Archive)
Úvod do teorie zajištění a ocenění derivátů, aneb co nám Blackův-Scholesův model napovídá o zajišťovacím riziku způsobeném cenovými skokyLecturer: Aleš Černý Affiliation: CBS University, London Masaryk university, Brno 1:00 PM • 4/9/2014
Abstract: The talk will explore quadratic hedging of derivatives in a complete and incomplete financial market. Starting with a discrete-time setting we will provide several numerical illustrations one of which leads to the famous Black-Scholes formula in the continuous-time limit . The talk is based on joint work with Jan Kallsen and Stephan Denkl of CAU Kiel.
Transaction Costs and Inertia in Charitable GivingLecturer: Maroš Servátka Affiliation: University of Canterbury, New Zealand Masaryk university, Brno 1:00 PM • 1/21/2014
Abstract: This paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyse the effect that transactions costs and inertia have on charitable giving. We conjecture that transaction costs are likely to have a greater effect on donations if the solicitations are received when potential donors are busy (when the opportunity cost of time is high) as opposed to when they have time on their hands to donate (when the opportunity cost of time is low). If donations do not have to be made immediately, inertia could also become a factor as people might intend to give, but then postpone making the payment until they have more time, and having postponed making the donation once, keep doing so until the opportunity to donate has passed. We find that introducing a transaction cost to a standard Dictator Game with charity as a recipient, and manipulating whether the donation can be made when we know subjects have time on their hands, reduces donations providing evidence of a transaction cost effect. Some weak evidence is found that giving people more time to donate reduces donations, which is consistent with an inertia effect.
Does Financing of Public Goods by Lotteries Crowd Out Pro-Social Incentives?Lecturer: Peter Katuščák Affiliation: CERGE-EI Masaryk university, Brno 1:00 PM • 12/12/2013
Abstract: We investigate the extent to which lottery financing of public goods crowds out voluntary contributions driven by social preferences. On average, we find presence of such crowding out effect. We then classify subjects by the strength of their conditional cooperation and find that the extent of crowding out is increasing with the the level of conditional cooperation, especially under a higher lottery prize. We interpret this finding as crowding-out of voluntary contributions driven by reciprocity.
Biofuels and Vertical Price Transmission: The Case of the U.S. Corn, Ethanol, and Food MarketsLecturer: Dušan Drabik Affiliation: Wageningen University Mendel Univ., Zemědělská 1, Brno, Room Q474 1:00 PM • 11/14/2013
Abstract: This is the first paper to analyze the impact of biofuels on the price transmission along the food chain. We analyze the U.S. corn sector and its vertical links with food and ethanol (energy) markets. We find that biofuels affect the price transmission elasticity in the food chain compared to a no biofuel production situation but the effect depends on the source of the market shock and the policy regime: the price transmission elasticity declines under a binding blender's tax credit and a food market shock. Our results also indicate that the response of corn and food prices to shocks in the corn and/or food markets is lower in the presence of biofuels. Finally, the sensitivity analyses indicate that our results are robust to different assumptions about the model parameters.
Dynamic Provisions in the Context of the Financial Crisis: Empirical Study of V4 countriesLecturer: Svatopluk Kapounek Affiliation: Mendel University, Brno ESF, Lipová 41a, Brno, Room S309 1:00 PM • 11/7/2013
Abstract: The pro-cyclical effect of provision is generally agreed and widely discussed in the context of the current financial crisis. The new model of the dynamic provisions applied in Spain showed anticyclical effects on credit and business cycle. We simulate development of the dynamic provisions during the financial crisis and discuss the possible consequences. We apply panel data model of past credit cycle to calibrate parameters following the same approach as in the Spanish dynamic provision. Our contribution is in application of dynamic provisions on the banking systems for the V4 countries.
Train Commuters' Scheduling Preferences: Evidence From a Large-Scale Reward ExperimentLecturer: Stefanie Peer Affiliation: Vienna University of Economics and Business ESF, Lipová 41a, Brno, Room S309 1:00 PM • 10/31/2013
Abstract: We investigate the trip scheduling behavior of Dutch train commuters, using data collected during a large-scale reward experiment with more than 1000 participants. Railway subscription owners were invited to join an experiment where they could earn (distance-based) monetary rewards if they traveled outside the (morning and evening) peak hours. A dedicated smartphone app was used to observe the trip timing and routing behavior of the participants. Compared to the pre-measurement, the share of peak trips decreased by ca. 20% during the reward period, and by 9% during the post-measurement. We estimate departure time choice models, drawing from multiple data sources to compute the attribute values for all choice alternatives. We are able to derive plausible revealed preference (RP) values for the participants' willingness-to-pay for reducing travel time, schedule delays, the number of transfers and crowdedness, and for increasing reliability.
Factional Splits in Proto-Hegemonic Mass Parties: The Case of the Welfare/Virtue Party in TurkeyLecturer: Marek Hudík Affiliation: Charles University Mendel Univ., Zemědělská 1, Brno, Room Q474 1:00 PM • 10/17/2013
Abstract: How does factional split occur in proto-hegemonic mass parties characterized by ideologies such as ultra-nationalism, socialism or religious fundamentalism? In our study, we show that the struggle of the opposition factions against the party leader's policies resembles the struggle of the opposition forces in authoritarian regimes. We build a game-theoretic model of factional split borrowing from the collective action theory used in revolution studies: The collective action problem, together with the fact that the party leader possesses an extensive control over the party organization, makes the replacement of the party leader with the opposition's canÂdidate unlikely. We argue that it is incomplete power transformation that typically results in factional split in these parties: The opposition succeeds in accumulating some power vis-Ă -vis the party leader but this amount of power is insufficient for the leadership turnover to occur. On the other hand, it may be sufficient to establish the organizational and electoral basis of a new party. We apply our model to the case of the religious fundamentalist Welfare/Virtue Party (1994-2001) in Turkey.
Corruption and Manipulation of Public Procurement: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary ThresholdsLecturer: Filip Pertold Affiliation: CERGE-EI ESF, Lipová 41a, Brno, Room S309 1:00 PM • 10/3/2013
Abstract: We present a methodology for detecting manipulation of public procurement and evidence showing how policies that create discontinuous incentives to avoid transparent competition lead to manipulation and active waste by procurement officials. Our methodology exploits a natural experiment in which new discretionary thresholds in the anticipated value of procurements were established. Manipulations reveal through bunching of procurements below the new thresholds and affect 11% of relevant contracts. Manipulations lead to increases in the chance of allocating contracts to anonymously owned firms often related to corrupt behavior, increases in the final prices of procurements and preferential prices for anonymous contractors.