19 Sep
15:15
Trust, Reciprocity and Menu-(in) dependence
Menu-dependence is a feature of a decision process according to which people behave differently not only because of the differences in the payoffs associated with the outcomes of their choices but also because of the payoffs associated with the choices they decided not to make. This phenomenon is involved in many explanations of other-regarding behavior based on the idea of reciprocity: a preference for rewarding the other player for acting on kind intentions and punishing her for acting on unkind intentions. Intentions, in fact, are derived by comparing what a player does and what he could have done and did not. We investigate the role of this mechanism in the context of a simple trust game, by looking at whether, as reciprocity theories predict, the likelihood of a trustworthy response is affected by the kindness of the trustor’s intentions. We find, first, no menu-dependence, in the sense that trustees do not vary their trustworthiness along with the perceived kindness; second, that trustors correctly anticipate trustors’ insensitivity to changes in kindness; third, that decision to repay trust is more intuitive and faster than the self-interested ones and, fourth, the decision to trust comes quicker than the outside option, when there is room for mutual gain. We think that these results may shed new light on the intentions-based explanations of reciprocal and trustworthy behavior.