18 Mar
12:00
Rewarding Investments in Innovation Through Auctions
This study examines whether bid advantages can stimulate innovation by comparing bonus-based incentives with prize-and-penalty schemes. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment with two sequential stages. In the innovation stage, participants choose an R&D investment level; in the auction stage, they compete for a procurement contract in a second-price auction. We implement three treatments: a benchmark with no incentive, bonus scheme, and prize-and-penalty scheme designed to be payoff-equivalent to the bonuses. While bonuses operate within the auction stage by rewarding the innovator and disadvantaging the non-innovator, prize-and-penalty schemes shift these incentives to the innovation stage, thereby removing auction distortion and reducing uncertainty. We test whether these mechanisms generate different levels of innovation and whether the timing and framing of incentives affect behavior, particularly through sunk-cost bias.