9 Apr
12:00
Institutional Factors and the Extraction of Limited Health Resources

The healthcare situation in many developed countries has become precarious due to limited supply and a steadily growing demand stemming from mandatory health cover for all. As a result, health resources may get allocated inefficiently with those with potentially serious conditions not getting treated in a timely manner. In this paper, we test measures to prevent such inefficiencies, including i) instituting a co-payment for using healthcare services, ii) creating a triage system based on self-reporting one's symptoms, and iii) receiving access to more accurate signals about one's health needs. Drawing on a game theoretic framework with other-regarding preferences, we conduct an online experiment with a large, representative sample of UK adults, where participants decide whether to extract resources from a limited common pool after receiving a noisy signal about their types. Our results suggest that all measures reduce unnecessary extractions from the common pool. While both the cost and self-report triage system have the highest impact on participants extraction choices, the accuracy treatment leads to the highest efficiency, as it reduces the errors stemming from noisy signals.