Public Lectures are hosted by distinguished speakers who present on popular topics in a field of economic research and policy making. Each event will provide an opportunity to students and researchers to enhance their understanding of economics.
The list of previously organized public lectures is here.
Feeling Smart: Why our Emotions are More Rational Than We ThinkLecturer: Eyal Winter Affiliation: Lancaster University and Hebrew University room D22, Faculty of Arts MU (Arna Nováka 1) 4:30 PM • 6/12/2019
"Feeling Smart" is the title of Eyal Winter's book that appeared 2015 with Perseus Books Group. The book deals with the relationship between our emotional being and our rational one, and the implications of this relationship to areas such as economics, business, romance and the social interactions. We shall address the following questions: Are emotions and rationality two separate systems? Can we synthesize emotions? What is the difference between autonomous and interactive emotions. What is the role of altruism in promoting self‐interest? We shall also mention recent research findings on the "love hormone" Oxytocin, and in particular the implications for economic and social interactions. Finally, if time permits we shall discuss how regret and our fear of regret shapes our financial behavior.
Behavioral Foundations of Collective ActionsLecturer: Juan Camilo Cárdenas Affiliation: Universidad de los Andes, Colombia Refectory of Augustinian Abbey at Mendel Square - Mendel Museum 9:00 AM • 10/5/2018
Lecture is organized within Seminar Series sponsored by Masaryk University.
Abstract: The focus of my work is on the analysis and design of institutions (rules of the game) that promote cooperation among individuals and the solution of social dilemmas (such as environmental issues) in the fairest, efficient, equitable, democratic and sustainable manners possible. My reflection is based on two main points. (i) First, I challenge two analytical frameworks for understanding and addressing environmental problems, namely market environmentalism and the institutional framework. I call for adopting a vision that conceives environmental problems basically as social collective action dilemmas, instead of market failures. (i) Secondly, I analyze current trends in behavioral and experimental approaches to the study of collective action and summarize the main contributions to the growing literature in this field.
Challenges to European Integration: Missions and InstrumentsLecturer: Tamás Szemlér Affiliation: National University of Public Service, Budapest ESF MU Room S308 11:00 AM • 9/27/2018
Abstract: The lecture attempts to highlight challenges to European integration by raising key concerns and generating debate about potential responses. This discussion is intended to be a starting point for further reflection on specific issues related to the European integration process. The starting point is the explanation why there is a need for a clear and realistic integration mission; the argumentation is supported by the example of the history of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), one of the most tangible achievements of European integration policy. The history of the EMU also highlights the critical importance of clarity and realism in any approach to integration. The discussion analysis moves next to the challenges that the EU is facing today and considers how the European Commission has evaluated and reacted to these challenges so far. Finally, the lecturer proposes some key elements of – and makes the case for – a constructive practical approach.
The lecture is based on the article entitled Challenges to European Integration: Missions and Instruments written by the lecturer, published in Politics in Central Europe (ISSN: 1801-422), Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 77–91, DOI: 10.2478/pce-2018-0004
Bio: Tamás Szemlér, Ph.D., is an associate professor at the Faculty of International and European Studies of the National University of Public Service (Budapest) since 1 September 2016. Between 1993 and 2010, he was a researcher at the Institute for World Economics (IWE) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences; in 2008-2009, he was Deputy Director (responsible for scientific affairs) of IWE. Between 2009 and 2016, he worked as an associate professor at the Faculty of International Management and Business of Budapest Business School; between 2009 and 2014 he was head of the Department of Economics; between 2012 and 2016, he was Dean of the Faculty of International Management and Business. He has over 140 publications; in his research and teaching activities, he focuses mainly on the issues of deepening, enlargement and external relations (economic and political) of the European Union.
Anonymous Black and Brown BodiesLecturer: Nicholas De Genova Affiliation: King's College London FSS MU U41 (Joštova 218/10) 4:00 PM • 5/31/2018
Paying for what kind of performance? Incentive pay and multitasking in mission-oriented jobsLecturer: Mirco Tonin Affiliation: University of Bozen-Bolzano MU Center at Šlapanice (near Brno) 9:00 AM • 1/19/2018
Authors: Daniel Jones (University of South Carolina), Michael Vlassopoulos (University of Southampton), Mirco Tonin (University of Bozen-Bolzano)
Abstract: How does performance pay (P4P) impact productivity on incentivized and unincentivized dimensions when workers may be intrinsically motivated by their job (e.g., public sector, nonprofit sector)? How does P4P impact the composition of workers in such jobs? We conduct a real-effort laboratory experiment, manipulating compensation and motivation, to answer these questions. We find that P4P has positive effects on productivity on the incentivized dimension (quantity) and negative effects on the unincentivized dimension (quality) for non-motivated workers. For motivated workers, P4P does not lead to a statistically significant change in either dimension. Finally, when workers can choose to remain in the experimentally-assigned payment scheme or opt for an outside option with a flat payment, but also no opportunity to be intrinsically motivated, we find that non-motivated workers sort on ability (higher ability workers opting into the P4P scheme) while motivated workers do not.
Odhad dopadu a škod kartelových dohodLecturer: Tomáš Houška ESF MU S309 4:00 PM • 11/16/2017
Kartelové dohody mezi konkurenty oslabují konkurenci na trhu a vedou k vyšším cenám. Firmy v takovýchto případech platí svým dodavatelům, kteří se domluvili na ceně, více, než kolik by platily na správně fungujícím trhu. Pokud je kartel odhalen, mohou poškozené firmy žádat o náhradu škody u soudu. Ale jak velkou škodu tyto firmy utrpěly? Jaká by byla tržní cena na fungujícím trhu a jak ovlivnil kartel zisk poškozených firem? Odpovědím, které soudu běžně poskytují ekonomové, se bude věnovat i tento seminář.
Is Economics Useful for Public Policy?Lecturer: James Alm Affiliation: University in New Orleans Mendelovo muzeum MU, Mendlovo nám. 1, Brno 9:00 AM • 10/13/2017
Prof. James Alm is Chair of Economics at Tulane University in New Orleans. Alm’s most recent research areas include tax compliance and tax evasion, the marriage tax, tax and expenditure limitations, tax amnesties, taxpayer responses to tax reforms, enterprise zones, the determinants of state economic growth, and corruption. He has worked extensively on fiscal and decentralization reforms in numerous countries, including Bangladesh, Jamaica, Grenada, Indonesia, Turkey, Hungary, China, Egypt, the Philippines, Russia, Uganda, Nigeria, India, Colombia, Nepal, Ukraine, Pakistan, South Africa, and Tunisia. Alm's international projects have been funded by the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, and the International Monetary Fund. Alm has published in various respected journals and has been ranked among the world's top economists of today.
What’s in a Name in a WarLecturer: Štěpán Jurajda Affiliation: CERGE-EI Faculty of Economics, Masaryk University, room P101 1:30 PM • 6/2/2017
We propose a novel empirical strategy for identifying and studying nationalism using name choices. We first show that having been given a first name that is synonymous with the leader(s) of the fascist Croatian state during World War II predicts volunteering for army service in the 1991-1995 Croatian war of independence and dying during the conflict. Next, we use the universe of Croatian birth certificates and the information about nationalism conveyed by first names to contrast the evolution of nationalism and its intergenerational transmission across locations affected by extreme war-related experiences. Our evidence suggests that in ex-Yugoslav Croatia, nationalism was on a continuous rise starting in the 1970s, that its rise was curbed in areas where con- centration camps were located during WWII, and that nationalist fathers consider the nationalism-transmission trade-off between within-family and society-wide transmission channels suggested by Bisin and Verdier (2001).
Discrimination in the Workplace : Experimental EvidenceLecturer: David Masclet Affiliation: University of Rennes 1 Mendel Museum, Mendlovo nám. 1a 5:00 PM • 6/1/2017
We examine labor market favoritism in a unique laboratory experiment design. Group identities are created and both employment preference rankings and wage offers favor in-group members. Workers positively reciprocate towards in-group employers by choosing higher effort in a gift exchange game. Thus, favoritism can be privately rational for employers. However, unemployed subjects are allowed to burn resources (at a cost to themselves), and we document significantly increased resource destruction when unemployment is due to favoritism towards others. This highlights a significant spillover cost of favoritism that is often ignored, and it points to one possible micro-foundation of some anti-social behavior.
Optimal Perception BiasesLecturer: Jakub Steiner Affiliation: CERGE-EI and University of Edinburgh ESF Masaryk University, P101 11:00 AM • 6/3/2016
We study perception biases arising under second-best perception strategies. Agent correctly observes all payoff-relevant parameters but cannot retain all the information until her decision. Evolution chooses a perception strategy that determines the pattern of information loss across many decision situations the agent encounters across her life. We argue that the optimal perception strategy exhibits illusion of control, over-confidence, and optimism.