21 Oct
2021
Delegation and overhead aversion with multiple threshold public goods
Abstract: Experimental studies have modeled individual funding of social projects as contributions to a threshold public good. We examine contributors’ behavior when faced with multiple threshold public goods and the possibility of coordinating contributions via an intermediary. Employing the experimental design developed in Corazzini (2020), we vary both the size of a ‘destination rule’, which places restrictions on the intermediary’s use of a contributor’s funds, as well as the overhead cost of the intermediary, modeled as a sunk cost incurred by the intermediary whether or not any public good is successfully funded. In an online experiment with live interaction, we show that subjects behave in line with equilibrium predictions with regard to the size of the destination rule, only increasing their contributions when there is no threat of expropriation by the intermediary. However, we find that the positive effect of a high destination rule is undone in the presence of overhead costs for the intermediary. While this is in direct conflict with the theory that predicts no role of such costs, it is in line with the sunk-cost bias as well as the phenomenon of ‘overhead aversion’ that is commonly exhibited by donors when selecting charities.